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NOTE AND COMMENT
Rejection of the instruction is not surprising in a State,
such as Montana, where different degrees of negligence are rec-
ognized. Various statutes describe "slight care and diligence,"
"ordinary negligence," "great care and diligence," and "gross
negligence."" The provision of Sec. 7579, on contributory neg-
ligence, is only that a plaintiff is barred if he has, "wilfully or
by want of ordinary care," brought the injury upon himself.
It can hardly be said, in this State, that the term "negligence"
in the instruction necessarily imports want of ordinary care.
There is, on the contrary, much reason for the view that the in-
struction might have meant or have been understood as meaning
that plaintiff would be barred by failure to exercise extraordin-
ary care, i. e., by slight negligence."
It thus seems evident that the writer in A. L. R. used the
term "negligence" in a sense different from that of the Montana
Supreme Court. His concept apparently denies existence of dif-
ferent degress of negligence." Probably that is the better con-
cept, but, in view of the Montana statutes and also of the mis-
leading character of the terminology, it is believed preferable to
refrain from using "slight" as an adjective modifying "negli-
gence," in instructions on contributory negligence. The word,
if used at all, ought to be employed only to qualify "want of
ordinary care."' But the rule of contributory negligence, in its
common law form, is so harsh that use of the term at all should
be discouraged.
Ira F. Beeler.
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS TO INDUSTRIAL
ACCIDENT BOARD
In Magelo v. Roundup Coal Mining Co.,' decided a few
months ago by the Montana Supreme Court, it was held, on
demurrer, that a letter, written by an employer to the Indus-
trial Accident Board with reference to an employee's claim
then pending, lost its privileged character because its state-
ments of circumstances surrounding the filing of previous
claims by the same employee, suggestive of fraud and malinger-
"See Secs. 1748.1, 7658, 7704, 7733, 7768, 7810, 7821, 7853, 7869, R. C. M.,
1935.
"See, to this effect, Cremer v. Portland, 36 Wis. 92 (1874), quoted in
BEACH ON CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, Sec. 20.
"The two concepts are discussed in 20 R. C. L. 21, Sec. 16.
""To instruct a jury that a plaintiff in a personal injury case cannot
recover if she was guilty of negligence in the slightest degree directly
contributing to her injury would, we think, tend to mislead most any
jury when such charge is not given in connection with a statement
that her only duty is to exercise ordinary care." Rogers v. Ziegler,
21 Ohio App. 186, 152 N. E. 781 (1925) at p. 783.
'96 P. (2d) 932 (Mont., 1939).
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ing, although coupled with similar suggestions as to the pending
claim, were irrelevant to the issue before the Board. The Court
assumed, but doubted, that such a letter would otherwise have
been privileged as a communication made in an official pro-
ceeding.
The law of libel recognizes two different degrees of privi-
lege in the publication of false and defamatory statements.
Both usually require that the contents of the communication
be relevant, or at least reasonably believed to be relevant, to the
issue to which the privilege extends.! But the first, said to be
absolute, accords immunity from liability for statements made
in the course of judicial and certain other important govern-
mental proceedings notwithstanding actual malice on the part
of the defamer.! The second, referred to as a qualified privi-
lege, extends in general to statements reasonably believed to be
helpful in protecting legitimate interests of defamer or recipi-
ent but is defeated by proof of malice in fact.' The Montana
statute, while not adopting this terminology, makes the distinc-
tion.
There can be no doubt that relevant communications made
by participants in proceedings of the Montana Industrial Acci-
dent Board are absolutely privileged. The statute does not lim-
it such privilege to judicial proceedings but extends it to "any
other official proceeding authorized by law." Even apart from
the statute it is probable that, since the Board exercises quasi-
judicial functions,' the privilege would be held absolute.'
2RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Secs. 585-591, 605; HARPER ON TORTS, Sees.
248, 252.
'RESTATEMENT, Sees. 585-591; HARPER ON TORTS, Sec. 248; NEWELL,
SLANDER AND LIBEL (4th Ed.), Sec. 350; Williams v. Standard-Exam-
iner Pub. Co., 83 Utah 31, 27 P. (2d) 1 (1933).
'RESTATEMENT, Sees. 594-605; HARPER ON TORTS, See. 349; NEWELL,
SLANDER AND LIBEL (4th Ed.), Sec. 389; Conrad v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 228 Mo. App. 817, 73 S. W. (2d) 438 (1934).
'R. C. M., 1935, Sec. 5692: "A privileged communication is one made:
1. In the proper discharge of an official duty; 2. In any legislative
or judicial proceeding, or in any other official proceeding authorized
by law; 3. In a communication, without malice, to a person Inter-
ested therein, by one who Is also interested, or by one who stands
In such relation to the person interested as to afford a reasonable
ground for supposing the motive for the communication innocent, or
who Is requested by the person interested to give the information;
4. By a fair and true report, without malice, of a judicial, legislative,
or other public official proceeding, or of anything said in the course
thereof."
'Dosen v. East Butte Copper Mining Co., 78 Mont. 579, 254 Pac. 880
(1927) ; State ex re. Magelo v. Industrial Accident Board, 102 Mont.
455, 59 P. (2d) 785 (1936) ; U. S. F. & G. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 42
Ariz. 422, 26 P. (2d) 1012 (1933) ; Bankers Indemnity Ins. Co. v. In-
dustrial Ace. Comm., 4 Cal. (2d) 89, 47 P. (2d) 719 (1935).
'"Judicial proceedings Include all proceedings before an officer or
tribunal who exercises judicial functions therein." RESTATEMENT OF
ToRTs, Sec. 587, Comment e. See also Mickens v. Davis, 132 Kan. 49,
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But can an ex parte communication, such as the letter in
the principal case, be treated as made in the proceeding? Some
cases, treating such communications like letters written to a
judge of an ordinary Court, deny the right of administrative
tribunals to consider them. Others, relying upon the admin-
istrative and investigative functions of the tribunal and upon
the inapplicability of orthodox rules of pleading and evidence,
hold to the contrary.' In view of the informality of proceedings
before the Board, the duty of the Board to investigate claims
fully, and the express provision of the Montana statute that
technical rules of evidence shall not be binding," it seems that
the latter line of authorities should be followed and that the
doubt expressed by the Court as to the correctness of its as-
sumption that the letter was a part of the proceedings should
not prevail. If proof of service had accompanied the letter, or
possibly even if it had been produced at the hearing, apparently
the Court would have conceded that it was a part of the pro-
ceedings, but Rule 17 of the Board requires proof of service of
complaint and answer only and the duty to give publicity to
the letter rested upon the Board if upon anyone.11
In Higgins v. Williams Pocahontas.Coal Co., where a let-
ter had been written by the employer' to the Compensation
Commissioner after hearing but within the time for re-opening,
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals squarely held that
statements in the letter were absolutely privileged. There is a
similar holding in a Texas case with respect to a letter written
to the Railroad Commission" and a decision in Illinois to like
effect as to objections filed with the Board of Election Com-
missioners.1'
Assuming, then, as did the Court, that the communication
was made in and as a part of the proceedings before the Board,
the decision that it lost its privilege because of irrelevancy seems
extremely doubtful. The authorities agree that, while some
pertinency is essential, all doubts are to be resolved in favor
thereof, since the privilege embraces everything which could
294 Pac. 896 (1931) ; Independent Life Ins. Co. v. Rodgers, 165 Tenn.
447, 55 S. W. (2d) 767 (1933).
'Bereda Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Board, 275 11. 514, 114 N. E. 275 (1916);
Ruda v. Industrial Board, 283 Ill. 550, 119 N. E. 579 (1918) ; F. W.
Merrick, Inc., v. Cross, 144 Okla. 40, 289 Pac. 267 (1913); Mid-Union
Drilling Co. v. Graham, 184 Okla. 514, 88 P. (2d) 619 (1939).
'Mietkiewski v. Wayne County Road Commissioners, 227 Mich. 227,
198 N. W. 981 (1924) ; Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Lincecum, 126
S. W. (2d) 692 (Tex. Civ. App., 1939); Simpkins v. State Banking
Dept., 45 Ariz. 186, 42 P. (2d) 47 (1935).
"R. C. M., 1935, Sec. 2938.
"Cole v. Town of Miami, 52 Ariz. 488, 83 P. (2d) 997 (1938).
"103 W. Va. 504, 138 S. H. 112 (1927).
"Aransas Harbor Terminal Ry. Co. v. Taber, 235 S. W. 841 (Tex. Comm.
App., 1921).
"Kimball v. Ryan, 283 Ill. App 456 (1936).
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possibly relate to the issue.' The requirement of relevancy
clearly is not a requirement that the matter be admissible in
evidence." Even if it were, however, it is by no means clear that
circumstances surrounding filing of prior claims might not be
admissible before the Board. The principle is stated thus in the
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS: "It is not necessary that the defama-
tory matter be relevant or material to any issue before the
Court. It is enough that it have some reference to the subject
of the inquiry. Thus, while a party may not introduce into
his pleadings defamatory matter which is entirely disconnected
with the litigation, he is not answerable for defamatory matter
volunteered or included by way of surplusage in his pleadings
if it has any bearing upon the subject matter of the litigatn."
Some authorities go so far as to make absolute privilege depend
merely upon the reasonable belief of the party that his state-
ment is relevant." It is submitted, therefore, that the Court in
the principal case mistakenly required relevancy in the eviden-
tiary sense and that, since clearly the references in the letter
to prior claims were not foreign to the subject matter before the
Board, the letter should have been held absolutely privileged.
Surely, in any event, the communication was qualifiedly
privileged. It appears to be generally held that a statement
made in a judicial proceeding, even if irrelevant, is entitled to
qualified privlege, i. e., the result then depends upon malice or
lack of malice." This is perhaps the equivalent of the above
statement that reasonable belief in relevancy is sufficient."
And, even if the letter be held not a part of the proceedings,
'Young v. Young, 18 F. (2d) 807 (D. C. App., 1927) ; Penick v. Rad-
cliffe, 149 Va. 618, 140 S. E. 664 (1927) ; Sacks v. Stecker, 60 F. (2d)
73 (C. C. A., 2d, 1932) ; Texas Co. v. Brewer & Co., 180 S. C. 325, 185
S. E. 623 (1936) ; Irwin v. Ashurst, 158 Ore. 61, 74 P. (2d) 1127
(1938); Parker v. Kirkland, 298 Ill. App. 340, 18 N. E. (2d) 709
(1939); Speenburgh v. Schwartz, 165 Misc. 508, 300 N. Y. Supp. 196
(1937); Wels v. Rubin, 254 App. Div. 484, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 350 (1938);
Myers v. Hodges, 53 Fla. 197, 44 So. 357 (1907).
"Irwin v. Newby, 102 Cal. App. 110, P. 282 Pac. 810 (1929) ; 20 Am.
Jur. 238-239, 246.
"Sec. 587, Comment c.
""The formula is broad and flexible: was the statement of the witness,
party, or counsel relevant or did it have 'reference or relation to' the
matter under consideration, or did the participant think so? If either,
he is within the protection of the immunity." GREEN, THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS IN TORT CASES, p. 1323.
"Lawson v. Hicks, 38 Ala. 279, 81 Am D. 49 (1862) ; Myers v. Hodges,
8upra, note 15; 36 C. J. 1252. Cf. Tuohy v. Halsell, 35 0kla. 61, 128
Pac. 126, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 323, Ann Cas. 1916B, 1110 (1912) ; NEW-
ELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL (4th Ed.), Sec. 371.
""It would be unfortunate to require the witness, at his peril, to pass
upon the relevancy of his testimony, and the more desirable rule is
merely to require that the statement have some reasonable relation to
the matter in controversy or that the witness himself reasonably be-
lieve It to be relevant." HARPER ON TORTS, p. 530.
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still it was entitled to qualified privilege because of the mutual
interest of sender and recipient.' But, of course, inasmuch as
the complaint charged malice, qualified privilege could not be
taken advantage of by demurrer."  Absolute privilege, on the
other hand, being independent of malice, may be shown on
demurrer where the facts giving rise to the privileged occasion
appear on the face of the complaint.'
Norman Hanson.
MUST ATTESTING WITNESSES BE ABLE TO SEE
TESTATOR'S SIGNATURE?
In only one case, In re Bragg's Estate,' has the Montana
Supreme Court been called upon to construe and apply the pro-
visions of Section 6980, sub-section 2, R. C. M., 1935, which re-
quires that, except as to holographicand nuncupative wills, "the
subscription must be made in the presence of the attesting wit-
nesses, or be acknowledged by the testator to them to have been
made by him, or by his authority." Since, then, the Montana
law with respect to the sufficiency of an acknowledgment of a
signature not made in the presence of attesting witnesses de-
pends upon the interpretation of this case, some consideration
of the opinion is justified. It is believed that, whatever may
be said of the correctness of the actual decision upon the facts,
the language of the opinion is such as to leave the rule of the
case obscure, and may lead to an interpretation of the case
which would be clearly opposed to the weight of authority in
jurisdictions having statutes similar to that of Montana.
Both of the attesting witnesses in this case testified that the
testatrix did not sign the instrument in their presence nor state
that her signature was subscribed thereto, but did declare it to
be her will and request them to witness. One of the witnesses
"The case would seem to fall under R. C. M., 1935, Sec. 5692(3), in view
of the investigative duties of the Board (cf. Pierstorff v. Gray's Auto
Shop, 58 Ida. 438, 74 P. (2d) 171 (1937)) and of the fact that the
employer was under Plan No. 1 of the Workmen's Compensation Act
(self-insurance).
"Pack v. Wakefield Item Co., 280 Mass. 451, 183 N. E. 70 (1932);
KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press, 13 F. Supp. 910 (W. D., Wash., 1936);
Rutledge v. Junior Order of United American Mechanics, 185 S. C.
142, 193 S. E. 434 (1937) ; Corwin v. Berkwitz, 190 App. Div. 952, 179
N. Y. Supp. 915 (1920); Pienhardt v. West, 217 Ala. 12, 115 So. 88
(1927) ; Locke v. Mitchell, 7 Cal. (2d) 599, 61 P. (2d) 922 (1936);
Powell v. American Towing & Lighterage Co., 131 Md. 539, 102 Atl.
747 (1917) ; 37 C. J. 50-51.
'Miles v. McGrath, 4 F. Supp. 603 (D. Md., 1933) ; Brown v. Cochran,
222 Iowa 34, 268 N. W. 585 (1936) ; Layne v. Kirby, 208 Cal. 694, 284
Pac. 441 (1930).
1106 Mont. 132, 76 P. (2d) 57 (1938).
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